Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.1 Measure 1.2 Measure 1.3 Measure 1.4 Measure 1.5 Measure 1.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• In order to improve the granularity of existing ad policies, developed a specific climate misinformation ad policy.

• Continued to enforce our four granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2023 report, the policies cover:
  • Medical Misinformation
  • Dangerous Misinformation
  • Synthetic and Manipulated Media
  • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories 

• Expanded the functionality (including choice and ability) in the EEA of our in-house pre-campaign brand safety tool, the TikTok Inventory Filter. 

• Improved our IAB certification for Sweden Gold Standard to 2.0.

• We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 1.1

Relevant Signatories involved in the selling of advertising, inclusive of media platforms, publishers and ad tech companies, will deploy, disclose, and enforce policies with the aims of: - first avoiding the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation to protect the integrity of advertising supported businesses - second taking meaningful enforcement and remediation steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or on sources that repeatedly violate these policies; and - third adopting measures to enable the verification of the landing / destination pages of ads and origin of ad placement.

QRE 1.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 1.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

• Medical Misinformation
• Dangerous Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories 

• Making state-affiliated media accounts that attempt to reach communities outside their home country on current global events and affairs ineligible for recommendation, which means their content won't appear in the For You feed.
• Prohibiting state-affiliated media accounts in all markets where our state-controlled media labels are available from advertising outside of the country with which they are primarily affiliated.
• Investing in our detection capabilities of state-affiliated media accounts.
• Working with third party external experts to shape our state-affiliated media policy and assessment of state-controlled media labels.

SLI 1.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict advertising on pages and/or domains that disseminate harmful Disinformation.

Country	Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy	Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	746	3
Belgium	1152	1
Bulgaria	328	7
Croatia	3	0
Cyprus	128	0
Czech Republic	111	0
Denmark	409	0
Estonia	90	0
Finland	235	0
France	4621	7
Germany	6498	63
Greece	911	8
Hungary	512	2
Ireland	565	1
Italy	2781	8
Latvia	131	4
Lithuania	19	0
Luxembourg	86	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	1179	3
Poland	1118	4
Portugal	438	1
Romania	10698	2
Slovakia	145	4
Slovenia	52	0
Spain	2558	17
Sweden	752	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	474	2
Total EU	36266	135
Total EEA	36740	137

Measure 1.2

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will tighten eligibility requirements and content review processes for content monetisation and ad revenue share programmes on their services as necessary to effectively scrutinise parties and bar participation by actors who systematically post content or engage in behaviours which violate policies mentioned in Measure 1.1 that tackle Disinformation.

QRE 1.2.1

Signatories will outline their processes for reviewing, assessing, and augmenting their monetisation policies in order to scrutinise and bar participation by actors that systematically provide harmful Disinformation.

SLI 1.2.1

Signatories will report on the number of policy reviews and/or updates to policies relevant to Measure 1.2 throughout the reporting period. In addition, Signatories will report on the numbers of accounts or domains barred from participation to advertising or monetisation as a result of these policies at the Member State level.

Country	0	0	0	0
Austria	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

• TikTok Inventory Filter: This is our proprietary system which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 jurisdictions in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found here. The Inventory Filter is informed by Industry Standards and policies include topics which may be susceptible to disinformation.
• TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”): Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.

• Zefr: Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with the Industry Standards.

• IAS: Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with the GARM Framework. 

Measure 1.4

Relevant Signatories responsible for the buying of advertising, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies, will place advertising through ad sellers that have taken effective, and transparent steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or in places that repeatedly publish Disinformation.

QRE 1.4.1

Relevant Signatories that are responsible for the buying of advertising will describe their processes and procedures to ensure they place advertising through ad sellers that take the steps described in Measure 1.4.

Measure 1.5

Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.

QRE 1.5.1

Signatories that produce first party reporting will report on the access provided to independent third-party auditors as outlined in Measure 1.5 and will link to public reports and results from such auditors, such as MRC Content Level Brand Safety Accreditation, TAG Brand Safety certifications, or other similarly recognised industry accepted certifications.

QRE 1.5.2

Signatories that conduct independent accreditation via audits will disclose areas of their accreditation that have been updated to reflect needs in Measure 1.5.

Measure 1.6

Relevant Signatories will advance the development, improve the availability, and take practical steps to advance the use of brand safety tools and partnerships, with the following goals: - To the degree commercially viable, relevant Signatories will provide options to integrate information and analysis from source-raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g., on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by ad buyers, namely advertisers and their agencies. - Advertisers, agencies, ad tech companies, and media platforms and publishers will take effective and reasonable steps to integrate the use of brand safety tools throughout the media planning, buying and reporting process, to avoid the placement of their advertising next to Disinformation content and/or in places or sources that repeatedly publish Disinformation. - Brand safety tool providers and rating services who categorise content and domains will provide reasonable transparency about the processes they use, insofar that they do not release commercially sensitive information or divulge trade secrets, and that they establish a mechanism for customer feedback and appeal.

QRE 1.6.1

Signatories that place ads will report on the options they provide for integration of information, indicators and analysis from source raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g. on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by buyers.

QRE 1.6.2

Signatories that purchase ads will outline the steps they have taken to integrate the use of brand safety tools in their advertising and media operations, disclosing what percentage of their media investment is protected by such services.

QRE 1.6.3

Signatories that provide brand safety tools will outline how they are ensuring transparency and appealability about their processes and outcomes.

QRE 1.6.4

Relevant Signatories that rate sources to determine if they persistently publish Disinformation shall provide reasonable information on the criteria under which websites are rated, make public the assessment of the relevant criteria relating to Disinformation, operate in an apolitical manner and give publishers the right to reply before ratings are published.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• In order to improve the granularity of existing ad policies, developed a specific climate misinformation ad policy.
• Continued to enforce our four granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2023 report, the policies cover:
  • Medical Misinformation
  • Dangerous Misinformation
  • Synthetic and Manipulated Media
  • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories 
• Expanded the functionality (including choice and ability) in the EEA of our in-house pre-campaign brand safety tool, the TikTok Inventory Filter. 
• Improved our IAB certification for Sweden Gold Standard to 2.0. 
• We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Country	Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy	Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	746	3
Belgium	1152	1
Bulgaria	328	7
Croatia	3	0
Cyprus	128	0
Czech Republic	111	0
Denmark	409	0
Estonia	90	0
Finland	235	0
France	4621	7
Germany	6498	63
Greece	911	8
Hungary	512	2
Ireland	565	1
Italy	2781	8
Latvia	131	4
Lithuania	19	0
Luxembourg	86	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	1179	3
Poland	1118	4
Portugal	438	1
Romania	10698	2
Slovakia	145	4
Slovenia	52	0
Spain	2558	17
Sweden	752	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	474	2
Total EU	36266	135
Total EEA	36740	137

Measure 2.2

Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.

QRE 2.2.1

Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.

• Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation
  
  

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

• Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation
  
  

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

Country	Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy	Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies	Number of impressions for ads removed under the political content ad policy	Number of impressions for ads removed under the four granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	746	3	2,405,688	0
Belgium	1152	1	414,078	16,971
Bulgaria	328	7	21,839	0
Croatia	3	0	69	0
Cyprus	128	0	10,838	0
Czech Republic	111	0	187,494	0
Denmark	409	0	1,333,325	12,268
Estonia	90	0	14,889	0
Finland	235	0	7,543,943	0
France	4621	7	14,427,406	510
Germany	6498	63	45,161,261	0
Greece	911	8	512,170	12,873
Hungary	512	2	3,675,505	0
Ireland	565	1	1,341,419	0
Italy	2781	8	6,836,564	12,029
Latvia	131	4	4,551	0
Lithuania	19	0	59,348	0
Luxembourg	86	0	5,472	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	1179	3	879,250	1,048
Poland	1118	4	610,009	0
Portugal	438	1	409,358	0
Romania	10698	2	27,208,895	0
Slovakia	145	4	52,215	0
Slovenia	52	0	53,989	0
Spain	2558	17	9,622,981	8,551
Sweden	752	0	4,565,753	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	474	2	120,449	1,367
Total EU	36266	135	127,358,309	64,250
Total EEA	36740	137	127,478,758	65,617

Measure 2.4

Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.

QRE 2.4.1

Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.

SLI 2.4.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the number of appeals per their standard procedures they received from advertisers on the application of their policies and on the proportion of these appeals that led to a change of the initial policy decision.

Country	Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy	Number of ad removals under the four granular misinformation ad policies	Number of impressions for ads removed under the political content ad policy	Number of impressions for ads removed under the four granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	746	3	2,405,688	0
Belgium	1152	1	414,078	16,971
Bulgaria	328	7	21,839	0
Croatia	3	0	69	0
Cyprus	128	0	10,838	0
Czech Republic	111	0	187,494	0
Denmark	409	0	1,333,325	12,268
Estonia	90	0	14,889	0
Finland	235	0	7,543,943	0
France	4621	7	14,427,406	510
Germany	6498	63	45,161,261	0
Greece	911	8	512,170	12,873
Hungary	512	2	3,675,505	0
Ireland	565	1	1,341,419	0
Italy	2781	8	6,836,564	12,029
Latvia	131	4	4,551	0
Lithuania	19	0	59,348	0
Luxembourg	86	0	5,472	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	1179	3	879,250	1,048
Poland	1118	4	610,009	0
Portugal	438	1	409,358	0
Romania	10698	2	27,208,895	0
Slovakia	145	4	52,215	0
Slovenia	52	0	53,989	0
Spain	2558	17	9,622,981	8,551
Sweden	752	0	4,565,753	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	474	2	120,449	1,367
Total EU	36266	135	127,358,309	64,250
Total EEA	36740	137	127,478,758	65,617

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 3.1

Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.

QRE 3.1.1

Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.

Measure 3.2

Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.

QRE 3.2.1

Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.

Measure 3.3

Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.

QRE 3.3.1

Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.

Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 4.1 Measure 4.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 4.1

Relevant Signatories commit to define "political and issue advertising" in this section in line with the definition of "political advertising" set out in the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.

QRE 4.1.1

Relevant Signatories will declare the relevant scope of their commitment at the time of reporting and publish their relevant policies, demonstrating alignment with the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.

• reference, promote, or oppose candidates or nominees for public office, political parties, or elected or appointed government officials;
• reference an election, including voter registration, voter turnout, and appeals for votes;
• include advocacy for or against past, current, or proposed referenda, ballot measures, and legislative, judicial, or regulatory outcomes or processes (including those that promote or attack government policies or track records); and
• reference, promote, or sell, merchandise that features prohibited individuals, entities, or content, including campaign slogans, symbols, or logos.

QRE 4.1.2

After the first year of the Code's operation, Relevant Signatories will state whether they assess that further work with the Task-force is necessary and the mechanism for doing so, in line with Measure 4.2.

Commitment 5

Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 5.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 5.1

Relevant Signatories will apply the labelling, transparency and verification principles (as set out below) across all ads relevant to their Commitments 4 and 5. They will publicise their policy rules or guidelines pertaining to their service's definition(s) of political and/or issue advertising in a publicly available and easily understandable way.

QRE 5.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policy rules or guidelines and on their approach towards publicising them.

Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 6.1 Measure 6.2 Measure 6.3 Measure 6.4 Measure 6.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 6.1

Relevant Signatories will develop a set of common best practices and examples for marks and labels on political or issue ads and integrate those learnings as relevant to their services.

QRE 6.1.1

Relevant Signatories will publicise the best practices and examples developed as part of Measure 2.2.1 and describe how they relate to their relevant services.

Measure 6.2

Relevant Signatories will ensure that relevant information, such as the identity of the sponsor, is included in the label attached to the ad or is otherwise easily accessible to the user from the label.

QRE 6.2.1

Relevant Signatories will publish examples of how sponsor identities and other relevant information are attached to ads or otherwise made easily accessible to users from the label.

QRE 6.2.2

Relevant Signatories will publish their labelling designs.

Measure 6.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and participate in research to improve users's identification and comprehension of labels, discuss the findings of said research with the Task-force, and will endeavour to integrate the results of such research into their services where relevant.

QRE 6.3.1

Relevant Signatories will publish relevant research into understanding how users identify and comprehend labels on political or issue ads and report on the steps they have taken to ensure that users are consistently able to do so and to improve the labels' potential to attract users' awareness.

Measure 6.4

Relevant Signatories will ensure that once a political or issue ad is labelled as such on their platform, the label remains in place when users share that same ad on the same platform, so that they continue to be clearly identified as paid-for political or issue content.

QRE 6.4.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the steps they put in place to ensure that labels remain in place when users share ads.

Measure 6.5

Relevant Signatories that provide messaging services will, where possible and when in compliance with local law, use reasonable efforts to work towards improving the visibility of labels applied to political advertising shared over messaging services. To this end they will use reasonable efforts to develop solutions that facilitate users recognising, to the extent possible, paid-for content labelled as such on their online platform when shared over their messaging services, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

QRE 6.5.1

Relevant Signatories will report on any solutions in place to empower users to recognise paid-for content as outlined in Measure 6.5.

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 7.1 Measure 7.2 Measure 7.3 Measure 7.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 7.1

Relevant Signatories will make sure the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors purchasing political or issue ads have provided the relevant information regarding their identity to verify (and re-verify where appropriate) said identity or the sponsors they are acting on behalf of before allowing placement of such ads.

QRE 7.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to collect and verify the information outlined in Measure 7.1.1, including information on the timeliness and proportionality of said tools and processes.

Measure 7.2

Relevant Signatories will complete verifications processes described in Commitment 7 in a timely and proportionate manner.

QRE 7.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the actions taken against actors demonstrably evading the said tools and processes, including any relevant policy updates.

QRE 7.2.2

Relevant Signatories will provide information on the timeliness and proportionality of the verification process.

Measure 7.3

Relevant Signatories will take appropriate action, such as suspensions or other account-level penalties, against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements via on-platform tactics. Relevant Signatories will develop - or provide via existing tools - functionalities that allow users to flag ads that are not labelled as political.

QRE 7.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to request a declaration on whether the advertising service requested constitutes political or issue advertising.

QRE 7.3.2

Relevant Signatories will report on policies in place against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements on-platform.

Measure 7.4

Relevant Signatories commit to request that sponsors, and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors, declare whether the advertising service they request constitutes political or issue advertising.

QRE 7.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report on research and publish data on the effectiveness of measures they take to verify the identity of political or issue ad sponsors.

Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 8.1 Measure 8.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 8.2

Relevant Signatories will provide a direct link from the ad to the ad repository.

QRE 8.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard.

Commitment 9

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 9.1 Measure 9.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 9.2

Relevant Signatories will explain in simple, plain language, the rationale and the tools used by the sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors (for instance: demographic, geographic, contextual, interest or behaviourally-based) to determine that a political or issue ad is displayed specifically to the user.

QRE 9.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and features in place to provide users with the information outlined in Measures 9.1 and 9.2, including relevant examples for each targeting method offered by the service.

Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 10.1 Measure 10.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 10.2

The information in such ad repositories will be publicly available for at least 5 years.

QRE 10.2.1

Relevant Signatories will detail the availability, features, and updating cadence of their repositories to comply with Measures 10.1 and 10.2. Relevant Signatories will also provide quantitative information on the usage of the repositories, such as monthly usage.

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 11.1 Measure 11.2 Measure 11.3 Measure 11.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 13.1 Measure 13.2 Measure 13.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 13.1

Relevant Signatories agree to work individually and together through the Task-force to identify novel and evolving disinformation risks in the uses of political or issue advertising and discuss options for addressing those risks.

QRE 13.1.1

Through the Task-force, the Relevant Signatories will convene, at least annually, an appropriately resourced discussion around novel risks in political advertising to develop coordinated policy.

Measure 13.2

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Building on our new AI-generated label for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI, we have expanded our efforts in the AIGC space by:
  • Implementing the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) Content Credentials, which enables our systems to instantly recognize and automatically label AIGC.
  • Supporting the coalition’s working groups as a C2PA General Member.
  • Joining the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) to drive wider adoption of the technical standard.
  • Publishing a new Transparency Center article Supporting responsible, transparent AI-generated content.
  • Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. This AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively.
• Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections’ which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections. 
• Continued to participate in the working groups on integrity of services and Generative AI.
• We have continued to enhance our ability to detect covert influence operations. To provide more regular and detailed updates about the covert influence operations we disrupt, we have a dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok’s transparency centre. In this report, we include information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

• Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
• Bulk distribution of a high-volume of spam; and
• Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

• Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
• Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

• facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
• provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures
• Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation
• Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure
• Our harmful misinformation policies combats conspiracy theories related to unfolding events and dangerous misinformation
• Our Trade of Regulated Goods and Services policy prohibits trading of hacked goods

• Realistic-appearing people under the age of 18
• The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

• prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
• remove registered accounts based on certain signals (ie, uncommon behaviour on the platform).

• They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or are working together to spread the same narrative.
• They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location, or using fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
• They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision making, beliefs and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

SLI 14.2.1

Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken at the Member State level under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.

TTP No. 1: Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) 

TTP no. 2: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)  

TTP No. 3: Use of fake followers or subscribers  

TTP No. 4: Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains

TTP No. 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)  

TTP No. 7: Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. “deep fakes”, “cheap fakes”...)

TTP No. 8: Use “hack and leak” operation (which may or may not include doctored content)

TTP No. 9: Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)

TTP No. 10: Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers

TTP No. 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers 

TTP No. 12: Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

Country	TTP 1 (Number of Fake Accounts Removed)	TTP 2 (Number of Fake Likes Removed)	TTP 3 (Number of Fake Followers Removed)	TTP 5 (Number of Accounts Banned Under Misinformation Policy)	TTP 7 (Number of videos removed for violation of Edited Media & AIGC Policy)
Austria	92511	12262551	9980544	177	110859
Belgium	176327	16913076	11916866	300	166222
Bulgaria	423060	6468521	4561129	175	75036
Croatia	74704	1821268	1965426	77	27536
Cyprus	86741	4176517	1706405	54	59263
Czech Republic	194925	3052689	4342681	134	51417
Denmark	155675	4183605	3154022	115	49328
Estonia	111506	687649	482641	29	19687
Finland	99745	3086208	3204999	92	60083
France	2061174	78227394	109481878	2587	1399713
Germany	1678822	131158324	125941360	2277	1380835
Greece	133443	14621872	7880295	215	206528
Hungary	84057	1821268	2589692	141	63319
Ireland	321237	4520433	3213842	235	32936
Italy	672344	60514367	35511559	805	746928
Latvia	60145	1690473	732030	48	99265
Lithuania	79417	1682687	2057659	76	42778
Luxembourg	73258	1920605	1574849	43	40901
Malta	60192	1395676	401869	0	12100
Netherlands	886619	23557961	17070055	567	202203
Poland	360959	8833014	10128172	1251	203835
Portugal	190906	9239486	3714261	206	151389
Romania	294195	11254476	14021343	1300	287851
Slovakia	131567	1208123	4288570	63	21883
Slovenia	298807	727133	678185	43	10131
Spain	709560	38331442	31084803	709	676935
Sweden	239020	15782957	12342226	284	163490
Iceland	31476	230931	120003	15	3353
Liechtenstein	1369	24827	893407	0	357
Norway	92800	5457966	3756414	178	59556
All EU	9750916	459139775	424027361	12003	6362451
All EEA	9876561	464982867	428797185	12196	6425717

SLI 14.2.2

Views/impressions of and interaction/engagement at the Member State level (e.g. likes, shares, comments), related to each identified TTP, before and after action was taken.

Country	TTP 1 (Number of followers of fake accounts identified at the time of removal)	TTP 2 (Number of fake likes prevented)	TTP 3 (Number of Fake Followers Prevented)	TTP 7 (Number of views of videos removed because of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy)
Austria	467635	39213306	25000123	216433
Belgium	544073	56682105	34550567	1119223
Bulgaria	188995	40004761	26400841	5977
Croatia	175230	17901159	18990456	58579
Cyprus	124021	6960047	18497473	19441
Czech Republic	348626	31099711	18233387	8287531
Denmark	298306	17585666	23806634	2742457
Estonia	239039	7385026	16887949	2063380
Finland	195684	19264460	20303735	464824
France	20207105	336499329	127136908	312078908
Germany	20545728	357582219	138933948	23904234
Greece	1702918	84211417	38712931	145950
Hungary	184291	28069699	24773097	86870
Ireland	697840	31110363	25239860	103199
Italy	5900534	606697045	158916638	1892355
Latvia	124765	11600082	17952175	4519
Lithuania	300241	11795998	18928046	25410
Luxembourg	611602	7987636	21051498	8729
Malta	226073	3466698	15758979	5811847
Netherlands	1575641	101316771	35162609	9080526
Poland	3192516	208518568	54501610	13404186
Portugal	370719	56146620	26901973	339124
Romania	4045608	83405388	44172801	623525
Slovakia	1347301	18154505	21010637	2014
Slovenia	45359	5843233	1942793	605
Spain	5351682	161280031	73920335	21882268
Sweden	528326	48240073	36451604	377862
Iceland	253997	1564206	2572695	6113
Liechtenstein	11129	70045	1045728	525
Norway	151088	20708187	7242021	139984
All EU	69539858	2398021916	1084139607	404749976
All EEA	69956072	2420364354	1095000051	404896598

SLI 14.2.3

Metrics to estimate the penetration and impact that e.g. Fake/Inauthentic accounts have on genuine users and report at the Member State level (including trends on audiences targeted; narratives used etc.).

Country	Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "Creator labeled as AI-generated"
Austria	110859
Belgium	166222
Bulgaria	75036
Croatia	27536
Cyprus	59263
Czech Republic	51417
Denmark	49328
Estonia	19687
Finland	60083
France	1399713
Germany	1380835
Greece	206528
Hungary	63319
Ireland	32936
Italy	746928
Latvia	99265
Lithuania	42778
Luxembourg	40901
Malta	12100
Netherlands	202203
Poland	203835
Portugal	151389
Romania	287851
Slovakia	21883
Slovenia	10131
Spain	676935
Sweden	163490
Iceland	3353
Liechtenstein	357
Norway	59556
Total EU	6362451
Total EEA	6425717

SLI 14.2.4

Estimation, at the Member State level, of TTPs related content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement with such content as a percentage of the total content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement on relevant signatories' service.

Country	TTP 1 (Ratio of monthly average of Fake accounts over monthly active users)	TTP 5 (Impersonation accounts as a % of monthly active users)	TTP 7 (Number of unique videos labelled with AIGC tag of "AI-generated")
Austria			38531
Belgium			75316
Bulgaria			78668
Croatia			18595
Cyprus			3165
Czech Republic			89409
Denmark			30694
Estonia			11220
Finland			49106
France			432739
Germany			502916
Greece			7936
Hungary			74704
Ireland			34736
Italy			393642
Latvia			18852
Lithuania			21581
Luxembourg			3319
Malta			3444
Netherlands			29448
Poland			316048
Portugal			64975
Romania			37467
Slovakia			28439
Slovenia			6969
Spain			493675
Sweden			105253
Iceland			4720
Liechtenstein			61
Norway			42172
Total EU	0.001	0.000013	2970847
Total EEA			3017800

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Building on our new AI-generated label for creators to disclose content that is completely AI-generated or significantly edited by AI, we have expanded our efforts in the AIGC space by:
  • Implementing the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) Content Credentials, which enables our systems to instantly recognize and automatically label AIGC.
  • Supporting the coalition’s working groups as a C2PA General Member.
  • Joining the Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) to drive wider adoption of the technical standard.
  • Publishing a new Transparency Center article Supporting responsible, transparent AI-generated content.
  • Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. This AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively.
• Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections’ which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections.
• We continue to participate in relevant working groups, such as the Generative AI working group, which commenced in September 2023.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

• AIGC that shows realistic-appearing people under the age of 18
• AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

• We have in place internal guidelines and training to help ensure that the training and deployment of our AI systems comply with applicable data protection laws, as well as principles of fairness.
• We have instituted a compliance review process for new AI systems that meet certain thresholds, and are working to prioritise review of previously developed algorithms.
  
  

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Rolled out two new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in the EU and two in EU candidate countries in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • France:  Agence France-Presse (AFP)
  • Portugal: Polígrafo
  • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
  • Moldova: StopFals!
• This brings the number of  general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in Europe to 11 (Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Netherlands, and Portugal).
• Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe:
  • Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
  • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
• Expanded our fact-checking coverage to a number of wider-European and EU candidate countries:
  • Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
  • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia.
  • Kazakhstan: Reuters
  • Moldova: AFP/Reuters 
  • Serbia: Lead Stories
• We ran 14 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 8 in the EU (Austria, Croatia, France, 2 x Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, and Romania)
    • Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Croatia: Faktograf
    • France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
    • Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Ireland: The Journal
    • Lithuania: N/A
    • Romania: Funky Citizens.
  • 1 in EEA
    • Iceland: N/A
  • 5 in wider Europe/EU candidate countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, and Moldova)
    • Bosnia: N/A
    • Bulgaria: N/A
    • Czechia: N/A
    • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
    • Moldova: StopFals!
• During the reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova. 
  • France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
  • Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
  • Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
  • Lithuania: Logically Facts
  • Romania: Funky Citzens
  • Ireland: Logically Facts
• Croatia: Faktograf
  • Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
  • Moldova: Stop Fals!
• Launched four new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guides that link to authoritative 3rd party agencies and organisations:
  • Central & Eastern European Floods (Austria, Bosnia, Czechia, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) 
  • Portugal Wildfires 
  • Spanish floods
  • Mayotte Cyclone
• Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Climate Change,, Holocaust Education, Mpox, and the War in Ukraine.
  Actively participated in the UN COP29 climate change summit by:
  • Working with the COP29 presidency to promote their content and engage new audiences around the conference as a strategic media partner.
  • Re-launching our global #ClimateAction campaign with over 7K posts from around the world. Content across #ClimateAction has now received over 4B video views since being launched in 2021.
  • Bringing 5 creators to the summit, who collectively produced 15+ videos that received over 60M video views.
  • Launching two global features (a video notice tag and search intervention guide) to point users to authoritative climate related content between 29th October and 25th November, which were viewed 400k times.
• Our partnership with Verified for Climate, a joint initiative of the UN and social impact agency Purpose, continued to be our flagship climate initiative, which saw a network of 35 Verified Champions across Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, and Spain, work with select TikTok creators to develop educational content tackling climate misinformation and disinformation, and drive climate action within the TikTok community.
• Partnered with the World Health Organisation (WHO), including a US$ 3 million donation, to support mental well-being awareness and literacy by creating reliable content and combat misinformation through the Fides network, a diverse community of trusted healthcare professionals and content creators in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, and Brazil. 
• Building on these efforts, we also launched the UK Clinician Creator Network, an initiative bringing together 19 leading NHS qualified clinicians who are actively sharing their medical expertise on TikTok, engaging a community of over 2.2 million followers.
• Strengthened our approach to state-affiliated media by:
  • Working with third party external experts to shape our state-affiliated media policy, assessment of state-controlled media labels, and continuing to expand its use. 
  • Continued investment in our detection capabilities for state-affiliated media (SAM) accounts, with a focus on automation and scaled detection. 
• Building on our AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content.
  • Our AIGC Transparency Campaign informed by WITNESS has reached 80M users globally, including more than 8.5M and 9.5M in Germany and France respectively.
• Brought greater transparency about our systems and our integrity and authenticity efforts to our community by sharing regular insights and updates.  In H2 2024, we continued to expand our Transparency Center with resources like our first-ever US Elections Integrity Hub, European Elections Integrity Hub, dedicated Covert Influence Operations Reports, and a new Transparency Center blog.
• Continued our partnership with Amadeu Antonio Stiftung in Germany on the Demo:create project, an educational initiative supporting young TikTok users to effectively deal with online hate speech, disinformation and misinformation.
• Continued to invest in training and development for our human moderation teams. 
• TikTok continues to co-chair the working group on Elections.
  
  

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

• For example, the four new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns rolled out in France, Georgia, Moldova, and Portugal, are all supported with search guides to direct users to authoritative sources. 
• Our COP29 global search intervention, which ran from 29th October and 25th November, pointed users to authoritative climate related content, and was viewed 400k times.
  
  

• To limit the spread of potentially misleading information, the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.
• The video's creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and is provided additional information about why the warning label has been added to their content. Again, this is to raise the creator’s awareness about the credibility of the content that they have shared. 

• RT - Russia Today UK
• RT - Russia Today Germany
• RT - Russia Today France
• RT- Russia Today Spanish
• Sputnik
• Rossiya RTR / RTR Planeta
• Rossiya 24 / Russia 24
• TV Centre International
• NTV/NTV Mir
• Rossiya 1
• REN TV
• Pervyi Kanal / Channel 1
• RT Arabic
• Sputnik Arabic
• RT Balkan
• Oriental Review
• Tsargrad
• New Eastern Outlook
• Katehon
• Voice of Europe
• RIA Novosti
• Izvestija
• Rossiiskaja Gazeta

• Harmful Misinformation, Online challenges, Covid-19, Election integrity, Scams, and how to safely share content about tragic events on TikTok.
• Our safety partners page provides details of some of our work with global experts, non-governmental organisations, and industry associations to help build a safe platform for our community.

SLI 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report, at the Member State level, on metrics pertinent to assessing the effects of the tools described in the qualitative reporting element for Measure 17.1, which will include: the total count of impressions of the tool; and information on the interactions/engagement with the tool.

Country	Number of impressions of state-affiliated media label (SAM)	Number of clicks on state-affiliated media label (SAM)	Clicks through rate of state-affiliated media label (SAM)	Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (mpox)	Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (Elections)	CTR of video Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	CTR of video Intervention (mpox)	CTR by video Intervention (Elections)	Number of impressions for search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	Number of impressions for search interventions (mpox)	Number of impressions for search interventions (Elections)	Number of impressions for search interventions (Climate change)	Number of clicks on search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	Number of clicks on search interventions (mpox)	Number of clicks on search interventions (Elections)	Number of clicks on search interventions (Climate change)	CTR of search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	CTR of search interventions (mpox)	CTR of search interventions (Elections)	CTR of search interventions (Climate change)	Number of impressions of public service announcements (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial)	Number of impressions of public service announcements (mpox)
Austria	3705075	5771	0.001557593	3987721	6065332	78371511	0.00277878	0.005051826	0.001992012	156298	467253	708656	228390	6187	2111	3263	196	0.03958464	0.004517895	0.004604491	0.000858181	16	26
Belgium	3789615	6994	0.00184557	3501679	15383226	0	0.003052536	0.004787292	0	200324	669059	0	207808	10626	2501	0	159	0.053044069	0.003738086	0	0.000765129	41	26
Bulgaria	7727480	9390	0.001215144	697482	5869376	29664185	0.004028778	0.00679033	0.001686141	62548	446240	121672	140769	1701	2724	367	183	0.027195114	0.006104338	0.003016306	0.001300002	17	39
Croatia	1656809	2786	0.001681546	658928	5206361	24640666	0.003373661	0.007821202	0.001692933	100586	561621	546661	159478	2631	3321	1767	128	0.026156722	0.00591324	0.003232351	0.000802619	6	13
Cyprus	752546	1166	0.001549407	311308	1309314	0	0.003819369	0.006010017	0	24629	77553	0	19126	445	452	0	20	0.018068131	0.005828272	0	0.001045697	4	4
Czech Republic	7602192	7762	0.001021021	2888696	6134172	329546	0.004759587	0.009942499	0.001007447	88635	587165	17994	163222	2476	4180	56	172	0.027934789	0.007118953	0.003112148	0.00105378	99	76
Denmark	2074577	4350	0.002096813	1690719	4604268	0	0.004065134	0.008214118	0	59881	435391	0	148528	1572	2571	0	134	0.026252067	0.005905037	0	0.000902187	13	17
Estonia	1391192	2402	0.001726577	406818	2279691	0	0.003987041	0.00802872	0	14970	147804	0	29383	476	926	0	44	0.031796927	0.006265054	0	0.001497465	60	12
Finland	3310339	9274	0.002801526	3314306	8904456	0	0.003627305	0.007459524	0	118664	648096	0	238286	2024	4591	0	213	0.017056563	0.007083827	0	0.000893884	27	30
France	32521568	28995	0.000891562	2293975	123453307	1301158781	0.004792554	0.003822433	0.001599036	1592000	3031084	15712577	652102	111776	5826	7306	446	0.070211055	0.001922085	0.000464978	0.000683942	562	473
Germany	37522365	49125	0.001309219	40208515	51643857	209773848	0.002756879	0.004731521	0.001247319	1383744	3901089	7265486	1761399	66652	15278	13805	1488	0.048167869	0.003916342	0.001900079	0.000844783	344	385
Greece	3107902	6491	0.002088547	2559183	9476029	0	0.003910232	0.006915661	0	492728	1145046	0	250015	2946	6796	0	361	0.005978958	0.005935133	0	0.001443913	14	28
Hungary	41012350	27450	0.000669311	4785260	5483667	0	0.003591236	0.007310437	0	118829	495768	0	270274	4853	3857	0	330	0.040840199	0.007779849	0	0.001220983	14	33
Ireland	3250908	6757	0.002078496	3352323	9413972	278245	0.003129173	0.00624168	0.00127226	112337	714141	1651434	221386	1848	2252	16293	118	0.016450502	0.003153439	0.009865971	0.000533006	20	38
Italy	12463432	16462	0.001320824	1987326	31117509	0	0.004668082	0.005592125	0	877504	2604995	0	1113346	11749	36148	0	818	0.013389113	0.013876418	0	0.000734722	74	63
Latvia	3063840	4027	0.001314364	491701	2821714	0	0.004234281	0.008449829	0	18212	206307	0	37048	668	1375	0	63	0.036679113	0.006664825	0	0.001700497	89	9
Lithuania	3025380	5056	0.001671195	685542	5065658	9102070	0.003958911	0.007301519	0.001649515	37622	484805	41034	112397	820	2767	127	176	0.021795758	0.005707449	0.003094994	0.001565878	41	11
Luxembourg	439714	628	0.001428201	181085	823972	0	0.003633653	0.005151874	0	11059	39807	0	14448	571	180	0	17	0.051632155	0.004521818	0	0.001176633	2	1
Malta	417073	605	0.001450585	206924	645827	0	0.002860954	0.004848048	0	7744	33713	0	9186	178	148	0	5	0.022985537	0.004389998	0	0.000544307	2	1
Netherlands	14557284	23801	0.001634989	12745193	15404762	0	0.002615025	0.007486971	0	490423	1010537	0	406345	6942	4547	0	308	0.014155127	0.004499588	0	0.000757977	80	147
Poland	203836052	63752	0.000312761	27175740	25070807	0	0.002600224	0.008385929	0	1069545	2560968	0	888768	842	19079	0	1136	0.000787251	0.007449917	0	0.001278174	154	172
Portugal	1518762	4985	0.003282279	1990257	6017068	0	0.003294047	0.006165794	0	221507	714886	0	198458	2507	3653	0	162	0.011317927	0.005109906	0	0.000816294	11	12
Romania	36420337	58883	0.001616762	3636828	12931412	1093883826	0.004134097	0.00773334	0.001400099	222020	1339325	21733061	375102	5125	7857	70746	513	0.023083506	0.005866388	0.003255225	0.001367628	21	40
Slovakia	1971329	3352	0.001700376	640942	1798295	0	0.003516699	0.007978669	0	42499	329754	0	93322	1331	2027	0	104	0.031318384	0.006147007	0	0.001114421	16	24
Slovenia	724668	1403	0.001936059	462528	2037178	0	0.003353311	0.006032364	0	30051	164647	0	34445	1520	793	0	26	0.05058068	0.004816365	0	0.000754827	3	5
Spain	6639002	11904	0.001793041	8574010	47595074	0	0.003606247	0.003745682	0	2155115	1775339	0	842382	39383	6112	0	503	0.018274199	0.003442723	0	0.000597116	51	82
Sweden	11757565	12977	0.001103715	5540266	15829378	0	0.004684613	0.00741501	0	175333	1106486	0	486125	4056	6128	0	405	0.023133124	0.005538254	0	0.000833119	87	55
Iceland	291908	589	0.002017759	215411	679537	4620010	0.003574562	0.006076196	0.004255618	5203	22964	78449	4668	147	245	1095	7	0.028252931	0.010668873	0.013958113	0.001499572	4	5
Liechtenstein	50186	48	0.000956442	11568	21397	0	0.004062932	0.006169089	0	478	1406	0	548	25	10	0	1	0.052301255	0.007112376	0	0.001824818	1	0
Norway	4367100	8605	0.001970415	2909307	6765469	0	0.004536476	0.009467784	0	89193	539291	0	223306	2505	3472	0	179	0.028085164	0.006438083	0	0.000801591	27	18
Total EU	446259356	376548	0.000843787	134975255	422385682	2747202678	0.003136642	0.005407563	0.001506023	9884807	25698879	47798575	9101538	291905	148200	113730	8228	0.029530673	0.005766789	0.00237936	0.000904023	1868	1822
Total EEA	450968550	385790	0.00085547	138111541	429852085	2751822688	0.00316689	0.005472562	0.001510639	9979681	26262540	47877024	9330060	294582	151927	114825	8415	0.029518178	0.005784932	0.002398332	0.000901923	1900	1845

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

1. France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
3. Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
4. Lithuania: Logically Facts
5. Romania: Funky Citzens
6. Ireland: Logically Facts
7. Croatia: Faktograf
8. Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
9. Moldova: Stop Fals!

• France:  Agence France-Presse (AFP)
• Portugal: Polígrafo
• Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
• Moldova: StopFals!

• Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
• Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
• Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.
  
  

• Our climate change search intervention tool is available in 23 official EU languages (plus Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users). It redirects users looking for climate change-related content to authoritative information and encourages them to report any potential misinformation they see.
• In April 2024, in partnership with The Mary Robinson Centre, TikTok launched the TikTok Youth Climate Leaders Alliance, a programme aimed at 18-30-year-olds looking to make significant changes in the face of the climate crisis.
• Actively participated in the UN COP29 climate change summit by:
  • Working with the COP29 presidency to promote their content and engage new audiences around the conference as a strategic media partner.
  • Re-launching our global #ClimateAction campaign with over 7K posts from around the world. Content across #ClimateAction has now received over 4B video views since being launched in 2021.
  • Bringing 5 creators to the summit, who collectively produced 15+ videos that received over 60M video views.
  • Launching two global features (a video notice tag and search intervention guide) to point users to authoritative climate related content between 29th October and 25th November, which were viewed 400k times.
• As of August 2024, popular hashtags #ClimateChange, #SustainableLiving, and #ClimateAction have more than 800,000 associated posts on TikTok, combined.

SLI 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories report on number of media literacy and awareness raising activities organised and or participated in and will share quantitative information pertinent to show the effects of the campaigns they build or support at the Member State level.

Country	Total number of impressions of H5 Page between July 1 and December 31 2024	Number of impressions of search intervention	Number of clicks on search intervention	Click through rate of the search intervention
France	72861	229676	1370	0.60%
Portugal	3400	107964	426	0.39%
Denmark	1540	10854	30	0.28%
Netherlands	2492	64241	226	0.35%
Ireland	1320	14282	46	0.32%
Finland	595	3725	25	0.67%
Sweden	1197	13444	64	0.48%
Spain	26213	1253955	3220	0.26%
Italy	1948	41297	181	0.44%
Austria and Germany	33220	15072256	45865	0.30%
Bulgaria	741	309132	1095	0.35%
Croatia	811	449332	1452	0.32%
Czech Republic	1025	954741	1722	0.18%
Slovenia	286	118972	407	0.34%

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

• We ran 14 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 7 in the EU (Austria, Croatia, France, 2 x Germany, Ireland and Lithuania)
    • Austria: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Croatia: Faktograf
    • France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
    • Germany (regional elections): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Germany (federal election): Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Ireland: The Journal
  • 1 in EEA (Iceland)
  • 6 in wider Europe/EU candidate countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czechia, Georgia, Moldova and Romania)
    • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
    • Moldova: StopFals!
    • Romania: Funky Citizens.
• Election speaker series. To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. During this reporting period, we ran 9 Election Speaker Series sessions, 7 in EU Member States and 2 in Georgia and Moldova. 
  • France: Agence France-Presse (AFP)
  • Germany: German Press Agency (dpa)
  • Austria: German Press Agency (dpa)
  • Lithuania: Logically Facts
  • Romania: Funky Citzens
  • Ireland: Logically Facts
  • Croatia: Faktograf
  • Georgia: FactCheck Georgia
  • Moldova: Stop Fals!

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.1 Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Onboarded two new fact-checking partners in wider Europe:
  • Albania & Kosovo: Internews Kosova
  • Georgia: Fact Check Georgia
• Continued to improve the accuracy of, and overall coverage provided by, our machine learning detection models. 
• Members of the EDMO working group for the creation of the Independent Intermediary Body (IIB) to support research on digital platforms.
  • Refined our standard operating procedure (SOP) for vetted researcher access to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Delegated Act on Data Access for Research.
  • Participated in the EC Technical Roundtable on data access in December, 2024.
  • Invested in training and development for our Trust and Safety team, including regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends and attending external events to share their expertise and support continued professional learning. For example: 
    • In the lead-up to certain elections, we invite suitably qualified external local/regional experts, as part of our Election Speaker Series. Sharing their market expertise with our internal teams provides us with insights to better understand areas that could potentially amount to election manipulation, and informs our approach to the upcoming election.
    • In June 2024, 12 members of our Trust & Safety team (including leaders of our fact-checking program) attended the GlobalFact11 and participated in an on-the-record mainstage presentation answering questions about our misinformation strategy and partnerships with professional fact-checkers.
  • Continued to participate in, and co-chair, the working group on Elections.
• In October, we sponsored, attended, and presented at Disinfo24 the annual EU DisinfoLab Conference in Riga.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 18.1

Relevant Signatories will take measures to mitigate risks of their services fuelling the viral spread of harmful Disinformation, such as: recommender systems designed to improve the prominence of authoritative information and reduce the prominence of Disinformation based on clear and transparent methods and approaches for defining the criteria for authoritative information; other systemic approaches in the design of their products, policies, or processes, such as pre-testing.

QRE 18.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the risk mitigation systems, tools, procedures, or features deployed under Measure 18.1 and report on their deployment in each EU Member State.

• Automated Review We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content. Content that is uploaded to the platform is typically first reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which looks at a variety of signals across content, including keywords, images, captions, and audio, to identify violating content. We work with various external experts, like our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists. If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either be automatically removed from the platform or flagged for further review by our human moderation teams.  In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.  We also carry out targeted sweeps of certain types of violative content including harmful misinformation, where we have identified specific risks or where our fact-checking partners or other experts have alerted us to specific risks. 
• Human Moderation While some misinformation can be enforced through technology alone—for example, repetitions of previously debunked content—misinformation evolves quickly and is highly nuanced. That’s why we have misinformation moderators with enhanced training and access to tools like our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners, who help assess the accuracy of content. We also have teams on the ground who partner with experts to prioritise local context and nuance. We may also issue guidance to our moderation teams to help them more easily spot and take swift action on violating content. Human moderation will also occur if a video gains popularity or has been reported. Community members can report violations in-app and on our website. Our fact-checking partners and other stakeholders can also report potential violating content to us directly.

1. For content that does not violate our CGs but may negatively impact the authenticity of the platform, we reduce its prominence on the For You feed and / or label it. The types of misinformation we may make  ineligible for the For You feed are made clear to users here; general conspiracy theories, unverified information related to an emergency or unfolding event  and potential high-harm misinformation that is undergoing a fact-check. We also label accounts and content of state-affiliated media entities to empower users to consider the sources of information. Our moderators take additional precautions to review videos as they rise in popularity to reduce the likelihood of content that may not be appropriate entering our recommended system. 
2. Providing access to authoritative information is an important part of our overall strategy to counter misinformation. There are a number of ways in which we do this, including launching information centres with informative resources from authoritative third-parties in response to global or local events, adding public service announcements on hashtag or search pages, or labelling content related to a certain topic to prompt our community to seek out authoritative information. 

• We collaborate with Irrational Labs to develop and implement specialised prompts to help users consider before sharing unverified content (as outlined in QRE 21.3.1),
• Yad Vashem created an enrichment program on the Holocaust for our Trust and Safety team. The five week program aimed to give our team a deeper understanding about the Holocaust, its lessons and misinformation related to antisemitism and hatred.
• We worked with local/regional experts through our Election Speaker Series to ensure their insights and expertise informs our internal teams ahead of particular elections throughout 2024.

QRE 18.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish the main parameters of their recommender systems, both in their report and, once it is operational, on the Transparency Centre.

• User interactions: Content you like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that you follow back.
• Content information: Sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country in which the content was published.
• User information: Device settings, language preference, location, time zone and day, and device type.

• Not interested: Users can long-press on the video in their For You feed and select ‘Not interested’ from the pop-up menu. This will let us know they are not interested in this type of content and we will limit how much of that content we recommend in their feed.
• Video keyword filters: They can add keywords – both words or hashtags – they’d like to filter from their For You feed.
• For You refresh: To help you discover new content, users can refresh their For You feed, enabling them to explore entirely new sides of TikTok.

QRE 18.1.3

Relevant Signatories will outline how they design their products, policies, or processes, to reduce the impressions and engagement with Disinformation whether through recommender systems or through other systemic approaches, and/or to increase the visibility of authoritative information.

•  Misinformation
  • Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society".
  • Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness.
  • Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest.
  • Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study.
  • Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event.
  • Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review.
• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied.
  • Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill.

• Fake Engagement
  • Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content.

• Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they’re seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.
• A repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions. 
  
  

SLI 18.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide, through meaningful metrics capable of catering for the performance of their products, policies, processes (including recommender systems), or other systemic approaches as relevant to Measure 18.1 an estimation of the effectiveness of such measures, such as the reduction of the prevalence, views, or impressions of Disinformation and/or the increase in visibility of authoritative information. Insofar as possible, Relevant Signatories will highlight the causal effects of those measures.

Country	Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)
Austria	31.80%
Belgium	33.80%
Bulgaria	34.00%
Croatia	33.70%
Cyprus	32.90%
Czech Republic	29.50%
Denmark	30.20%
Estonia	28.50%
Finland	27.20%
France	37.10%
Germany	30.10%
Greece	32.10%
Hungary	31.40%
Ireland	29.60%
Italy	37.70%
Latvia	30.90%
Lithuania	30.80%
Luxembourg	33.60%
Malta	35.40%
Netherlands	27.80%
Poland	28.90%
Portugal	33.10%
Romania	30.10%
Slovakia	28.90%
Slovenia	33.30%
Spain	34.10%
Sweden	29.40%
Iceland	27.90%
Liechtenstein	19.60%
Norway	25.40%
Total EU	32.20%
Total EEA	32.10%

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

• Misinformation 
  • Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or may induce panic about a crisis event or emergency, including using historical footage of a previous attack as if it were current, or incorrectly claiming a basic necessity (such as food or water) is no longer available in a particular location.Health misinformation, such as misleading statements about vaccines, inaccurate medical advice that discourages people from getting appropriate medical care for a life-threatening disease, or other misinformation which may cause negative health effects on an individual's life
  • Climate change misinformation that undermines well-established scientific consensus, such as denying the existence of climate change or the factors that contribute to it.
  • Conspiracy theories that name and attack individual people.
  • Conspiracy theories that are violent or hateful, such as making a violent call to action, having links to previous violence, denying well-documented violent events, or causing prejudice towards a group with a protected attribute.

• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Election misinformation, including:
    • How, when, and where to vote or register to vote;
    • Eligibility requirements of voters to participate in an election, and the qualifications for candidates to run for office;
    • Laws, processes, and procedures that govern the organisation and implementation of elections and other civic processes, such as referendums, ballot propositions, or censuses;
    • Final results or outcome of an election.

• Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
  • Realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
  • The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
  • Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
    • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation;
    • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour;
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

• Fake Engagement
  • Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
  • Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Misinformation 
  • Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society"
  • Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness
  • Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest
  • Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study
  • Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event
  • Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review

• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied
  • Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill

• Fake Engagement
  • Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

Country	Number of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Misinformation policy	Number of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy	Number of views of videos removed because of violation of Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy	Number of videos ineligible for promotion under Misinformation policy
Austria	2888	1313102	472	843182	414	216433	1696
Belgium	3902	2844929	1002	107828	2092	1119223	2688
Bulgaria	1568	5435715	182	110186	227	5977	1600
Croatia	789	973202	64	3753	1361	58579	616
Cyprus	511	1241327	86	1333	948	19441	326
Czech Republic	2720	4705302	275	25952	465	8287531	6470
Denmark	1455	2979180	335	14082	315	2742457	1157
Estonia	319	77555	41	866	208	2063380	453
Finland	984	1784968	199	1944	716	464824	811
France	44354	61693484	4390	8369126	8563	312078908	24035
Germany	50335	162220869	12231	3510858	11199	23904234	30934
Greece	4198	4431258	649	1726365	8742	145950	1735
Hungary	2002	9947587	308	273247	261	86870	957
Ireland	4676	4802257	2051	568596	1063	103199	2154
Italy	21035	39078480	3910	1578217	3574	1892355	19481
Latvia	694	3745925	48	9	129	4519	459
Lithuania	520	1122197	57	26	203	25410	647
Luxembourg	279	162787	66	2180	223	8729	121
Malta	168	5599	70	97	183	5811847	173
Netherlands	5422	2811880	1046	55695	1883	9080526	6189
Poland	13028	59545691	768	3942081	772	13404186	9872
Portugal	2629	31071224	535	28529	1010	339124	1400
Romania	14103	64183832	4276	33123122	937	623525	11739
Slovakia	1365	4714713	41	677	98	2014	1472
Slovenia	574	22494	28	111	66	605	346
Spain	22581	37024505	2126	3554918	4392	21882268	54592
Sweden	3489	9893681	633	6424	762	377862	2423
Iceland	122	153566	26	19	85	6113	77
Liechtenstein	35	0	20	0	48	525	33
Norway	1798	5158745	313	1152478	679	139984	1200
Total EU	206588	517833743	35889	57849404	50806	404749976	184546
Total EEA	208543	523146054	36248	59001901	51618	404896598	185856

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

• specialised prompts for unverified content, which alerts viewers to unverified content identified during an emergency or unfolding event and
• our state-controlled media label, which brings transparency to our community in relation to state affiliated media entities and raises awareness among users to encourage users to consider the reliability of the source.
  
  

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• At TikTok, we strive to bring more transparency to how we protect our platform.  We continue to increase the reports we voluntarily publish, the depth of data we disclose, and the frequency with which we publish.
• In December 2024, we published our newest collection of transparency reports, including our: Community Guidelines Enforcement Report (July-September 2024); Government Removal Requests Report; Law Enforcement Information Requests Report, IP Removal Requests Report; and most recent Covert Influence Operations Reports, where we shared information about the influence networks we disrupted in October and November 2024.
• We also worked to make it easier for people to independently study our data and platform. For example through: 
  • our Research Tools which empower over 500 research teams to independently study our platform.
  • the downloadable data file in the Community Guidelines Enforcement Report offering access to aggregated data, including removal data by policy category, for the 50 markets with the highest volumes of removed content.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

• user interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back); 
• Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published); and 
• User information  (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device types). 
  
  

• Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.
• Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them(see here). 

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Country	Number of users that filtered hashtags or words	Number of users that clicked on "not interested"	Number of times users clicked on the For You Feed Refresh
,Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label
Austria	53057	886639	52559	149390
Belgium	67734	1322561	83721	241538
Bulgaria	34081	744333	38568	153704
Croatia	20196	486259	23134	46131
Cyprus	7895	176600	13456	62428
Czech Republic	45392	753417	35791	140826
Denmark	35294	573821	27747	80022
Estonia	11648	151267	11558	30907
Finland	45185	586897	43657	109189
France	332521	7939397	486316	1832452
Germany	503549	7977800	648033	1883751
Greece	52519	1344879	68577	214464
Hungary	46966	1020692	28543	138023
Ireland	54952	801523	52714	67672
Italy	261272	6455485	295958	1140570
Latvia	15527	279241	24888	118117
Lithuania	21247	325564	23209	64359
Luxembourg	4519	76244	5508	44220
Malta	3137	77760	4923	15544
Netherlands	135944	2081920	150651	231651
Poland	196496	3383567	175988	519883
Portugal	57677	1152515	61327	216364
Romania	85551	2629162	165990	325318
Slovakia	18482	347681	13822	50322
Slovenia	9983	177990	19591	17100
Spain	275604	6889325	381588	1170610
Sweden	82868	1371265	111934	268743
Iceland	4720	57250	3175	8073
Liechtenstein	129	3563	291	418
Norway	48188	685406	63483	101728
Total EU	2479296	50013804	3049751	9333298
Total EEA	2532333	50760023	3116700	9443517

Commitment 21